Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 23
Issue 5 Issue 5 - 1991

Article 2

1991

Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing in Transnational Litigation
Spencer W. Waller

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Spencer W. Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing in Transnational Litigation, 23 Vanderbilt Law
Review 925 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol23/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing
in Transnational Litigation
Spencer Weber Waller*
ABSTRACT

This Article contends that the current state of the debate over the balancing of interests in the extraterritorialapplication of United States law
is outmoded and in need of serious reexamination. Most commentators
and scholars continue to focus on the area of jurisdiction to prescribe,
the acceptability of the effects test, and the development of lists of United
States andforeign interests to be balanced by a United States court before
exercisingjurisdiction.
Professor Waller contends that this debate is no longer productive.
Extraterritoriality,with some limitationsfor the interests of other states,
is an acceptedfeature of United States law, and approaches the degree of
binding state practice to be considered a rule of customary international
law. In addition, the concept of extraterritorialityand interest balancing
has spread beyond the area of jurisdiction to prescribe and has permeated all aspects of transnationallitigation procedure.
These cases now raise on a regular basis difficult questions ofjurisdiction to prescribe, personal jurisdiction, and discovery abroad. The Supreme Court's response has been to callfor the same type of unstructured
and highly discretionary balancingof interests tests that has plagued the
antitrust area since the Timberlane decision.
Professor Waller argues that such unstructured balancing tests impose
significant and unfamiliar burdens on parties and courts trying to resolve issues that go beyond the private interests of the litigants and seek
to address the interests the United States and a foreign state may have in
an otherwise private dispute. The author argues that the problems raised
by the spread of an unstructured balancing of interests require a deeper
probing of the nature, expression, and documentation of foreign interests. Professor Waller setsforth the type offoreign interests that mandate
deference by a United States court, the expression of those national inter-
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ests, and the sources of information available to document such interests
as a matter of evidence, and not merely rhetoric.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The extraterritorial application of United States law has been addressed in hundreds of articles, monographs and treatises,1 and two sepal. Over 450 writings address the subject of the extraterritorial application of United
States law. In another context, the author identified over 300 works on the topic of the
limits of national jurisdiction in 1985. See Waller & Simon, Analyzing Claims of Sovereignty in InternationalEconomic Disputes, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 4 n.18 (1985).
Through August 1990, approximately 160 additional articles have appeared indexed
under extraterritoriality in the Index to Legal Periodicals. For bibliographies on the
extraterritorial application of national law, see Behney, Bibliography, 15 LAW & POL'Y
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rate Restatements by the American Law Institute.2 The majority of these
pieces deal explicitly with the jurisdictional aspects of the extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust law. This commentary has defended the application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce,3 condemned the practice as a violation of international law,4 and proposed
numerous tests and limitations on the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act to foreign interests.5
The extraterritorial debate has become unproductive. For better or
worse, extraterritoriality is an accepted part of United States antitrust
law and enforcement policy. The courts and the United States government generally agree on the use of comity principles. They agree further
that courts and policy makers should balance the interests of the United
States and foreign states in determining whether the United States has
sufficient interests to justify asserting jurisdiction with the attendant
friction.

6

More importantly, the same principles have spread beyond the narrow
issue of the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws. Comity and interest
balancing have escaped the boundaries of jurisdiction to prescribe altogether and pervasively influence the7 areas of personal jurisdiction and
discovery in transnational litigation.
Continuing debate over extraterritoriality and comity serves only to
obscure the more important analysis of how such issues are decided in
United States courts on the basis of the evidence presented, rather than
on rhetoric. The challenge is to address the balancing of interests process
itself. The nature and sources of foreign interests must be defined and
the means of determining and expressing those interests must be developed. The most important issue involved, however, is the determination
of which foreign interests warrant United States restraint.
This Article examines the growth of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
the development of balancing of interests tests in the area of jurisdiction
to prescribe. Section III of the Article then explores the spread of unstructured interest balancing tests to more general transnational litigation
issues of personal jurisdiction and choice of discovery rules. Section IV
examines the current state of scholarship and the failure to directly adINT'L Bus. 1187 (1983); Behney, Bibliography, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303
(1987).
2. See infra notes 15-17, 24-27 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
See infra notes 18-47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48-80 and accompanying text.
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dress the principled application of the balancing of interests process
throughout United States transnational litigation. Section V analyzes the
challenge ahead in defining the nature, expression, and documentation of
foreign interests necessary for a meaningful balancing process. Section
VI then applies these concepts to illustrate the type of analysis permitting an informed use of the balancing tests so integral and prevalent in
United States law and policy.
II.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COMITY IN JURISDICTION TO
PRESCRIBE

A.

The Growth of Extraterritoriality

The initial development of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the balancing of interests based on principles of comity are directly related to the
development of United States antitrust law regarding anticompetitive
conduct abroad." The first pure extraterritorial application of United
8. While a variety of other regulatory laws have since been applied on an extraterritorial basis, the balancing of interests approach has not yet been adopted with the same
enthusiasm as in the antitrust area. Instead, the analysis has largely been limited to
examining congressional intent and applying the law on an extraterritorial basis if an
affirmative intent can be ascertained or inferred. See Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U.L. REV.
598 (1990); Turley, Transnational Discriminationand the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U.L. REV. 339 (1990).
In the securities area, the courts typically have asserted jurisdiction based on conduct
within the United States or under the traditional effects test first set out in the antitrust
context in Alcoa. See MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1990)(no jurisdiction over London purchase of securities by a Hong Kong buyer in
a foreign offering as to which American buyers. were disqualified as purchasers);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (jurisdiction over
shareholder derivative suit involving share repurchase in Canada because of harm to
United States purchasers and use of United States securities exchanges). Cf Fidenas AG
v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1979) (incidental conduct in United States insufficient when effect entirely
abroad); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975) (three-part test
based primarily on situs of conduct and effects but also considering nationality of
parties).
The inroads made by the balancing of interests test were acknowledged, but heavily
criticized by Judge Bork in Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C.Cir.
1987). Zoelsch concerned a fraud claim pr6mised on the fact that the defendant took
action in the United States regarding a securities transaction abroad that produced no
effect in this country. Zoelsch was a case of first impression in the D.C. Circuit, and left
the court free to formulate its own test for subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Bork rejected any explicit balancing of United States and foreign interests,
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States antitrust law occurred in United States v. Aluminum Co. of

America (Alcoa).9 This case concerned collusive activities of bauxite producers outside of the United States. The Second Circuit held that United
States courts could exercise jurisdiction over conduct abroad when the
conduct was intended to, and actually did, affect the United States.'" The
court considered conduct having economic effects within the United
States indistinguishable from actual conduct within our borders."
Subsequent decisions interpreted Alcoa expansively. 2 These decisions
for the most part disregarded the intent component of the test.' 3 In addi-

stating:
[I]t would also seem counterproductive to adopt a balancing test, or any test that
makes jurisdiction turn on a welter of specific facts. As we know from our experience in the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, such tests are difficult to
apply and are inherently unpredictable. They thus present powerful incentives for
increased litigation on the jurisdictional issue itself, which inevitably tends to defeat efforts to protect limited American judicial resources. A strong argument has
also been made that balancing tests "are not faithful to the principle of comity
among nations," for in practice they tend to deemphasize foreign sovereign interests and almost never lead a court to decline jurisdiction.
Id. at 32 n.2 (citations omitted).
Extraterritoriality is also present in statutes that explicitly regulate foreign trade such
as export controls, foreign antiboycott provisions, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which have explicit extraterritorial application through the expansive definition of acts
within United States commerce. Extraterritoriality is also a feature of such diverse areas
of United States law as taxation, bankruptcy, civil rights, environmental law, and criminal law enforcement. See, e.g., Behney, supra note 1.
The call for an explicit balancing of interests between the United States and affected
foreign jurisdictions has come primarily from the commentators, but has not yet been
adopted by the courts in interpreting the scope of these equally important statutes.
9. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d
Cir. 1945)(on certification and transfer from the United States Supreme Court for lack of
a quorum of qualified judges).
Alcoa represented a clean break from the era of jurisprudence marked by Justice
Holmes' decision in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59
(1909), which held the Sherman Act could not be applied to conduct wholly outside the
United States. The intervening cases therefore focused on locating some conduct within
the United States as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
10. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
11. Id. at 444-45.
12. See Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REv.
1452 (1956). For example, the United States through May 1973 filed 268 antitrust suits
involving foreign trade. None were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAVS 498-543 (2d ed. 1973).
13. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Presidents Line, 285 F. Supp. 949,
953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), appeal denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.,
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tion, the courts found increasingly trivial effects sufficient to adjudicate
the conduct of foreigners abroad under United States antitrust law."4
The perceived abuse of the intended effects test was addressed by the
American Law Institute in its Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (the Second Restatement).'5 Section 18 of the
Second Restatement limited the jurisdiction of United States courts to
conduct abroad causing an effect within the United States if:
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effects are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.' 0
The Restatement also proposed a balancing of interests analysis based on
comity to avoid conflicting and contradictory legal rulings by two or
more states.'

7

Japan Line Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
14. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf Western Industries, 473 F. Supp.
680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court has subject matter jurisdiction if effect is more than de
minimis).
15.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(1965) [hereinafter Second Restatement].
16. Id. § 18.
17.

Section 40 of the Second Restatement states:

Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the

rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct from the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement ac-

tions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be

expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.

Id. § 40.
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B.

The Adoption of the Comity Test

The seminal judicial adoption of a comity-based balancing of the interests of the United States and foreign states came in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. i" Timberlane involved allegations of a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from milling lumber in Honduras and
exporting it to the United States. The Ninth Circuit rejected the effects
test because of its failure to consider other states' interests. The court
applied a three-part test in its analysis: first, there must be some effect,
actual or intended, on United States commerce; second, a greater burden
is placed on the plaintiff to show cognizable injury; and third, a court
must determine whether United States interests outweigh the interests of
the foreign state affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.1 9
On remand, the district court again dismissed the complaint utilizing
the new balancing of interests test.20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding in conclusory fashion that United States interests were
outweighed by those of Honduras in the dispute.2

18.

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on

appealfollowing remand, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
19. Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 613. The court proposed seven elements to be
weighed in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) the nationality, location, and principal places of business of the parties;
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can achieve compliance;
(4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere;
(5) the existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce;
(6) the foreseeability of such effect; and
(7) the relative importance of conduct in the United States as compared with
conduct abroad.

Id. at 614.
20. 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
21. The Ninth Circuit stated:
It follows that all but two of the factors in Timberlane 's comity analysis indicate
that we should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over this antitrust case. The potential
for conflict with Honduran economic policy and commercial law is great. The
effect on the foreign commerce of the United States is minimal. The evidence of
intent to harm American commerce is altogether lacking. The foreseeability of the
anticompetitive consequences of the allegedly illegal actions is slight. Most of the
conduct that must be examined occurred abroad. The factors that favor jurisdiction
are the citizenship of the parties and, to a slight extent, the enforcement effectiveness of United States law. We do not believe that this is enough to justify the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over this case.
Timberlane Lumber, 749 F.2d at 1386.
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The Third Circuit adopted a variation of the Timberlane test in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.22 The court in Mannington
dismissed a complaint seeking treble damages and injunctive relief relating to allegations that foreign patents had been secured by fraud. The
court held that although the district court had jurisdiction under the Alcoa intended effects test, the court should, as a matter of comity, balance
the same type of interests set forth in Timberlane before exercising
jurisdiction.23
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (the Third Restatement) adopted yet another variation of Timberlane.24 This approach
requires a similar balancing of United States and foreign national interests, not as an exercise in comity, but as an affirmative element of jurisdiction. 2' This is an attempt to codify the Timberlane analysis as a principle of international law. The Third Restatement permits jurisdiction
over conduct that was either intended to produce significant effects, or in
fact produced such effects, if such jurisdiction is "reasonable. ' 26 Essentially, the Third Restatement measures reasonableness through an open22. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
23. Id. at 1292. The Third Circuit set forth 10 factors to be considered:
1. The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. The nationality of the parties;
3. The relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to
that abroad;
4. The availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. The existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. The possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or to be under conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances; and
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations had addressed the issue.

Id. at 1297-98.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1986) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
25. Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883-84 (5th Cir. 1982).
26. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 402. Although the balancing of interests
is mandatory to determine reasonableness under the Third Restatement, it is unclear
whether the Third Restatement requires a state to defer to another state with greater
interests in a particular controversy. Section 403(3) of the Third Restatement provides
that following the balancing of interests, a state "should" defer to a foreign state with
greater interests.
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ended balancing of national interests."
C.

Applying Timberlane

Subsequent court decisions have done little to provide content to the
Timberlane balancing of interest process. For example, in Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes Company,2 8 the Ninth Circuit applied the
Timberlane test and refused to apply United States trademark law to an
extraterritorial dispute. The court relied upon an intuitive analysis of the
third element of the Timberlane test, holding that the interests of the
United States were outweighed by the interests of the Philippines in the
regulation of the use of trademarks within Philippine territory.2"

27.

These factors include:

(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulatory state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;

(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;

(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and

the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the

regulation:
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or eco-

nomic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the

international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.

Id. § 403.
28. 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985).
29. The court stated:
Application of the Lanham Act to wholly foreign Philippine commerce could create a conflict with Philippine patent and trademark law and with pending proceedings in that country. Further, adjudication of the right to use the trademarks
in Philippine commerce with nations other than the United States would require
the testimony of Philippine nationals and the production and analysis of Philippine documents. The effect on United States commerce from the alleged illegal use
of the trademarks in trade between the Philippines and other foreign countries is
relatively insignificant compared to the effect on Philippine commerce. These factors indicate that the significant interest of the Philippines in restricting the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act should preclude extension of the Act to
wholly foreign commerce in this case. The other Timberlane I considerations do

934
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There appears to be only one case dismissed pursuant to a balancing
of interest analysis test that would not have been dismissed under the
traditional effects test. In In Re Insurance Antitrust Litigation,30 a federal district court dismissed an antitrust challenge to an agreement
among London insurers regarding the type and language of certain insurance coverage offered in the United States. The court concluded that
a significant conflict existed with foreign law and policy given the extensive foreign regulation of the insurance industry, the antipathy of the
United Kingdom toward United States antitrust law, and the existence of
British blocking statutes designed specifically to thwart the investigation,
trial, and enforcement of judgments in United States private antitrust
suits.3" The court determined that the defendants and the evidence were
located principally in the United Kingdom and that a United States
judgment would be unenforceable in British courts because of the blocking statutes.32 The court indicated that while no specific intent to harm
the United States existed, significant effects occurred within the United
States that were reasonably foreseeable. 33 Finding that the interests of
the United States and Great Britain were of equal importance, the court
concluded that the degree of conflict with British policy dictated a refusal
to exercise jurisdiction. 4
D.

United States Governmental Policy Towards Extraterritorial
Antitrust Jurisdiction

The Department of Justice affirmed both the principle of extraterritoriality and the role of comity in the application of United States antitrust
law to conduct outside the United States in the 1977 and 1988 International Antitrust Guidelines.35 The 1977 International Guidelines fol-

not mandate a contrary result.
Id. at 1396 (citations omitted).
30. 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989).

31.

Id. at 487-89.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST

GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

(1977), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.

CCH 13,110 [hereinafter 1977

INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES]; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS

(CCH) 113,109 [hereinafter 1988

(1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.

INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES].

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has devoted considerably less attention to
questions of extraterritoriality. The FTC generally has cited to Timberlane favorably,
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lowed the principles of the Second Restatement, indicating that United
States antitrust laws "should be applied to an overseas transaction when
there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce; and, consistent with these ends, it should avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign nations. '' 3 6 In addition, the
1977 Guidelines suggest that a "direct or intended effect" on the United
States is necessary to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.37 The 1977 International Guidelines do not discuss Timberlane, though they explicitly
acknowledge the role of comity in case investigation and prosecution.3 8
The 1988 International Guidelines adopt similar language in describing United States jurisdiction.39 The 1988 Guidelines contain an exten-

and has adopted a balancing of interests approach in exercising prosecutorial discretion
in foreign commerce investigations and complaints. Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174,
1265 n.21 (1979); see also SKF Industries, 94 F.T.C. 6, 74 (1979); cf.Institut Merieux,
S.A., File No. 891-0098, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,779, 55 Fed. Reg. 1614 (Jan.
17, 1990) (consent decree permitting merger between Canadian and French potential
competitors in production of vaccines with no assets in United States upon condition of
sale of key assets in Canada); see generally Holmes, Government Antitrust Actions and
Remedies Involving Foreign Commerce: Procedural and Substantive Limitations, 4
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 105, 115 n.47-48 (1982) (argues that critics of the application
of antitrust laws to commercial activities abroad often fail to recognize the procedural
and substantive limitations that restrain government agencies). The FTC, however, has
not issued international guidelines of its own, and has not expressly announced its position regarding the principles set forth in the 1988 International Guidelines. Owen &
Parisi, InternationalMergers and Joint Ventures: A Federal Trade Commission Perspective, presented at the 1990 Fordham Corporate Institute (personal remarks of FTC
Commissioner Deborah K. Owen).
36. 1977 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 35. The 1977 International
Guidelines state:
Competition by foreign producers is particularly important when imports are or
could be a major source of a particular product, or where the domestic industry is
dominated by a single firm or a few firms. An agreement or set of private agreements designed to raise the price of such imports or to exclude them from the
domestic market raises most serious antitrust concerns. Antitrust enforcement can
be expected against domestic firms and foreign firms subject to our jurisdiction for
participation in such agreements. Moreover, the form of agreement is not controlling; an informal undertaking embodied in a single conversation may be just as
punishable as the same undertaking contained in a complete contract. Any type of
restraint which limits the competition offered by significant foreign competitors
and products in our domestic market will be examined with great care by enforcement officials.
Id. at 6-7.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id.
39. The 1988 International Guidelines state:
Just as the acts of U.S. citizens in a foreign nation ordinarily are subject to the
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sive discussion of comity and the balancing of interests as a consideration
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in asserting jurisdiction.40 The
Department of Justice recognizes the significance of comity and indicates
that it will examine whether significant interests of a foreign sovereign
will be affected adversely by an enforcement action. 4 ' The Department's
primary concern is avoiding any actual conflict between United States
antitrust enforcement and the laws and policies of a foreign sovereign. 2
The Justice Department also takes the unprecedented position that the
doctrine of comity should not be applied to dismiss actions brought by
the Government."' This apparent inconsistency stems from the Department's views that comity concerns in private litigation result from the act

law of the country in which they occur, the acts of foreign citizens in the United
States ordinarily are subject to U.S. law. The reach of the U.S. antitrust laws is
not limited solely to conduct and transactions that occur within the United States,
however. Conduct relating to U.S. import trade that harms consumers in the
United States may be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties involved. Thus,
for example, applying the Sherman Act to restrain or punish a private international cartel the purpose and effect of which is to restrict output and raise prices to
U.S. consumers may be both appropriate and necessary to effective enforcement of
that Act. On the other hand, the Sherman Act does not reach the activities of U.S.
or foreign firms in foreign markets if those activities have no direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. interstate commerce, on import trade or
commerce, or on the export trade or commerce of a person engaged in trade or
commerce in the United States.
1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 4.
40. Id. § 5; see also Small, Managing ExtraterritorialJurisdictionProblems: The
United States Government Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1987) (discussing State Department practice).
41. 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 5.
42. If an actual conflict exists, the Department considers several factors in its enforcement decisions. These factors include:
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the
United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or
competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the
United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated
by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic
policies.
Id.§ 5 n.170.
43. Id. § 5 n.167.
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of state doctrine and the limited role of the courts in foreign affairs.""
The Department indicates that the decision to bring action represents an
affirmative determination by the executive branch that the interests of
the United States outweigh those of the other state affected, and that the
challenged conduct is more harmful to the United States than the potential harm to foreign relations resulting from the litigation.45 The 1988
International Guidelines further state that governmental actions do not
raise the risk of judicial intrusion into the legitimate affairs of a foreign
sovereign, because the government considers such factors in its decision
to bring the action.4"
This no vel proposition, however, has not been tested in court. While a
court most likely will give great deference to the views of the government
in matters relating to foreign affairs,4 7 it is unlikely that a court will
consider itself bound to exercise jurisdiction in a case merely because of
the views of one of the parties involved.

III.

THE SPREAD OF COMITY AND BALANCING OF INTERESTS

THROUGHOUT UNITED STATES TRANSNATIONAL

LITIGATION

PROCEDURE

The need for a coherent framework applying comity principles and
the balancing of interests now extends beyond antitrust analysis. The
United States Supreme Court has adopted these principles in several important areas involving transnational litigation.

44. Id. This aspect of the Guidelines constitutes an inappropriate revival of the policies set forth during the use of the Bernstein doctrine in which a court facing an act of
state issue would refrain from adjudicating the case unless and until the United States
government would advise the court that the case would not interfere with the conduct of
United States foreign policy. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d. 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Bernstein has been replaced by a
practice of the courts proceeding unless the government contends that foreign policy
objectives would be injured. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military
Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984). Even when the government
makes such a representation, some courts will not abstain automatically from adjudicating, but independently will determine the risks from proceeding to decide the case on the
merits. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See
infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
45. 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 5 n.167.
46. Id.
47. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

938

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

A.

[Vol. 23.925

PersonalJurisdiction

A primary area in which notions of comity and interest balancing have
expanded is the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In addition to receiving
actual notice of the complaint, a defendant must fall properly within the
personal jurisdiction of the court. 8 The United States Constitution imposes requirements beyond literal compliance with statutory requirements for personal jurisdiction."' Specifically, the defendant must have
"Cminimum contacts" with the jurisdiction before the assertion of jurisdiction will comport with notions of fundamental fairness implicit in the
due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution." These minimum contacts must be based on "some
acts by which the defendant purposefully avails, itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." 51
The Supreme Court has imposed the additional requirement of "reasonableness" to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. In
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,52 the Court considered a
product liability suit brought by a United States consumer against a Japanese manufacturer of motorcycle tires. The Japanese defendant brought
a claim for indemnity against the Taiwanese company that manufactured the tire valves. Following a settlement between the plaintiff and
the Japanese defendant, the Supreme Court held that the United States
did not have personal jurisdiction over the claim between the two foreign
parties. 3 The Court split evenly on the issue of whether the Taiwanese
corporation's awareness that its products were entering United States
commerce was sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test for personal
jurisdiction. 4
Nonetheless, a majority of the Court held that the extension of personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese defendant would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."5 5 The Court held that
48. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
50. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); InternationalShoe,
326 U.S. at 316.
51. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958);
accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
52. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
53. Id. at 113.
54. Id. at 109, 117.
55. Id. at 113, citing InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction depended upon: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the
shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 56 The Court concluded that the United States interests in the dispute were "slight" and imposed great burdens on the
Taiwanese defendant.

57

The Asahi decision has far greater significance than any of the subject
matter jurisdiction disputes. Challenges to personal jurisdiction are litigated frequently in all areas of the law. Unfortunately, subsequent case
law has not developed the open-ended Asahi balancing test or presented
guidance in this difficult analysis of foreign and domestic interests.
Moreover, the analysis often does not vary from the traditional inquiry
of whether minimum contacts existed in the first place.
In Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (USA),
Inc.," the trial court denied a motion to dismiss antitrust claims against
a Japanese manufacturer, finding that NEC's contacts with the United
States as a whole were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.59 The court in NEC found sufficient contact in NEC's use
of United States federal courts to pursue claims, direct advertising of its
trademark in the United States, trading of American Depository Receipts in United States securities markets, and sale of its products in the
6 1 the Ninth
United States.60 Similarly, in Sinatra v. National Enquirer,
Circuit held that when a defendant purposely does business in the
United States, it has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the exercise of

56.

Id. at 113, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.

57. Id. at 114. The Court also noted the probable jurisdiction of both the Japanese
and Taiwanese courts and the difficult choice of law questions if the United States court
asserted jurisdiction. Id. The Court stated:
In every case, however, those interests, as well as the Federal Government's interest in its foreign relations policies, will be best served by a careful inquiry into the
reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwill-

ingness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State. "Great care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the
international field."
Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
58.

671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987).

59. Id. at 1539.
60.

Id. at 1539-40.

61.

854 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1988).
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jurisdiction is unreasonable. 62

6
In Karsten Manufacturing Corp. v. United States Golf Association, 3
the court more explicitly relied upon the reasonableness principles of
Asahi in dismissing an antitrust claim. A golf club manufacturer filed an
action against a foreign golf association that prohibited the use of the
plaintiff's clubs at sanctioned tournaments. The Arizona district court
declined to exercise jurisdiction over officers and members of the association residing in Great Britain because the association did no business in
Arizona, took no purposeful acts in Arizona to injure the plaintiff, and
did not enforce their rules anywhere in the United States. 64 The court
further noted the burden on the defendants in defending the action in
United States district court, the availability of other fora, and the long
standing controversy between the United States and Great Britain regarding the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law.65
Similarly, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. British-American
Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit found a lack of personal jurisdiction
over a foreign insurance company that allegedly received funds fraudulently transferred from a United States bank.66 The court found it unreasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction when the defendant's presence in California was limited to taking physical possession of a check

and transferring the proceeds by wire to Fiji.6 7 The court further relied

on the status of the defendant as a foreign national, the subject of the
controversy being a foreign corporation, the location of the evidence
outside the United States, and the governing law being that of Fiji as
further evidence of the unreasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the
dispute.68

62. Id. at 1198-1202; accord Mason v. F. Lli Luigi & Franco Dal Maschio Fu
G.B., 832 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding personal jurisdiction over a foreign
machinery manufacturer who had been added as a third party defendant when interests
of the plaintiff and the forum state made jurisdiction reasonable, and distinguishing
Asahi as an action involving contribution claims between two foreign corporations); Hall
v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.W.Va. 1987) (finding jurisdiction over actual manufacturer of product in product liability suit).
63. 728 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Ariz. 1990).
64. Id. at 1432-34.
65. Id. at 1435-36.
66. 828 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 1442-43.
68. Id. at 1444; see also Wilson v. Kuwahara Co., Ltd., 717 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (rejecting personal jurisdiction over Japanese parts manufacturer in product
liability action against Japanese bicycle manufacturer); Garrett v. Beaver Run Ski
Enter., 702 F. Supp. 265 (D. Colo. 1988) (no personal jurisdiction when foreign manufacturer sold only to distributor in another state who then sold into Colorado); Smith v.
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B.

Choice of Discovery Rules

United States courts apply a similar, unstructured balancing analysis
to the choice of discovery rules available in United States litigation involving foreign parties. The United States is a party to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence (Hague Convention), 6 which imposes significantly more restrictive conditions on discovery than do the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 0 or state law equivalents. In addition,
the Hague Convention generally requires discovery in a form acceptable
under the legal systems of both nations involved.
Because of the difficulties associated with the use of the Hague Convention,7 a conflict developed in both state and federal court over

Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (rejecting personal
jurisdiction over Japanese manufacturer which sold lathe to regional retailer serving
states other than forum state); Ward v. Armstrong, 677 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1988)
(no personal jurisdiction for manufacturer which was successor to manufacturer doing
business in forum state, not sufficient contacts for successor); Huang v. Sentinel Gov't
Sec., 657 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (unrelated telephone calls to United States and
single visit insufficient for personal jurisdiction in securities fraud case against foreign
defendant).
69. 23 U.N.T.S. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. Signatories to this Convention include
Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 2637.
71. Obtaining the right to take a deposition under the Hague Convention is very
different from the traditional domestic notice or subpoena for deposition which is prepared by the parties or issued as a ministerial matter by the clerk's office of the United
States district court conducting the litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 45(d). A party must
first seek the issuance of a letter rogatory or letter of request from the United States court
pursuant to motion under Rule 28(b), and any applicable local rules governing the briefing and hearing of motions. The other party or parties to the litigation may oppose the
motion, propose modifications, or request additional areas of discovery from the witness.
Once the letter of request has been issued by the United States court it must be transmitted to the Central Authority of the receiving country for review to determine whether
the letter of request comports with the Hague Convention, any reservations adopted by
the receiving jurisdiction, and local procedure. The letter normally will not be executed
by the receiving Central Authority if it seeks a type of discovery not permitted under the
Convention or local procedure. Most of the signatories to the Convention, for example,
have executed a reservation under article 23 barring the use of letters of request to obtain
pretrial discovery as that term is understood in the United States.
In addition, a foreign state may refuse outright to enforce a request under the Convention. At least two foreign courts have refused specifically to enforce letters rogatory in the
context of private treble damage antitrust litigation in the uranium industry. In Rio
Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977), the
British Law Lords refused to enforce a letter rogatory requested by Westinghouse to
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whether the Hague Convention was the required or preferred method
for obtaining discovery of evidence abroad. The Supreme Court unsuccessfully attempted to clarify the issue in SocitO Nationale Industrielle

obtain evidence in support of its claim that its inability to fulfill uranium delivery contracts was the result of an international uranium cartel. In another aspect of the same
controversy, the Canadian Supreme Court refused to enforce a letter rogatory in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 39, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 163,285
(Canada 1980), on the grounds that the extraterritorial assertion of United States antitrust law violated Canadian public policy and Canadian sovereignty.
If the letter of request is proper in both form and substance, the Central Authority
will transmit the request to the appropriate court which will execute the request. If the
examination takes place in a civil law jurisdiction, the examination normally will take
place by or in the presence of a judicial officer, which may impose further delays in
scheduling.
The costs of proceeding under the Hague Convention may be prohibitive in cases with
limited monetary value. While English and French are the official languages of the Convention, the Convention also permits reservations requiring the translation of documents
into the national language or languages. Normally, the witness also will have the right to
have the examination conducted in his or her native language, which requires additional
translation fees for the examination itself. The additional limitations imposed by local
procedural rules normally will require the assistance of local counsel in the preparation
of the request, and the scheduling and conduct of the examination. In addition, each
party normally will bear its own expenses in connection with the travel costs of the
foreign examination.
The examination itself will be conducted under local procedural rules and not those of
the United States. The witness may not necessarily be sworn prior to testimony. In most
civil law jurisdictions, the examination will be conducted by a judicial officer based upon
written questions submitted by the parties. The witness may refuse to answer any questions under a valid privilege of either the United States or the jurisdiction of the examination. Most civil law jurisdictions require the examining officer to prepare a protocol
summarizing the questions and answers rather than' creating a verbatim transcript of the
proceedings.
The final protocol or transcript of the examination may be in a form very different
from a United States deposition. The admissibility of such evidence will depend on the
degree of reliability of the procedures used in the examination. Evidence obtained in
response to a letter rogatory or letter of request will not be excluded merely because it
differs in form from discovery taken under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but
may be excluded when wholly lacking in reliability and probative value. FED. R. CIv. P.
28(b); see also United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Badalamento No. 84 Cr. 236 (PNL) (S.D.N.Y. 11/8/85) (available on Westlaw, 1985
WL 3844) (admitting testimony where civil law jurisdiction prohibited witness taking
oath); Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Uebersee
Finanz-Korporation A.G. v. Brownell, 121 F. Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1954).
For a detailed examination of the procedures applicable in each signatory to the

Hague Convention, see B.

(1984).

RIsTAu,

I

INTERNATIONAL

JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE

§
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A~rospatiale v. United States District Court.72 The Court held that the
Hague Convention was neither the exclusive nor the preferred method of
seeking discovery abroad." The Court held that the trial court must
render its decision on a case-by-case basis by balancing the particular
facts of the case, the sovereign interests of the two legal systems, and the
likelihood that the choice of discovery rules will be effective.2 4
Although vague, Akrospatiale is revolutionary. The Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Socitk InternationalePour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers"5 held that compliance with discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was mandatory
absent a protective order from the United States court. 6 Rogers further
held that the requirements of foreign law were relevant only to the decision of what sanctions are applicable for the failure to comply with discovery.2 7 Under Akrospatiale, in contrast, foreign law considerations are
now relevant to whether discovery requests under the Federal Rules of
78
Civil Procedure will be permitted.

The A~rospatiale test is significant only for its vagueness, which represents a trend toward the same unstructured and discretionary balancing analysis already present in personal and subject matter jurisdiction
questions. 9 This inherent vagueness is compounded by the failure to delineate which party has the burden of proof under the three part test.
Although subsequent cases have not resolved this or any of the other
ambiguities posed by A~rospatiale, most courts have bypassed the problem by placing the burden of proof on the party opposing the use of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8"

72.

482 U.S. 522 (1987).

73. Id. at 529. The use of the Hague Convention is required to obtain evidence
abroad from non-party witnesses from a signatory slate, unless the United States is party
to additional multilateral or bilateral treaties with the foreign jurisdiction.
74. Id. at 544.
75. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
76. Id. at 204-06.
77. Id. at 207-08.
78. Socigtb Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544. See also THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 442(1)(c) (calling for balancing of interests before authorization of any discovery located abroad).
79. Determination of preliminary jurisdiction questions also requires application of
this same balancing approach. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853
F.2d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988) (apply three-part test for choice of discovery rules governing whether to apply Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Rich v. KIS California, Inc.
121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (using three-part test to determine discovery
rules for personal jurisdiction decision).
80. Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc. 121 F.R.D. 254 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Haynes v.
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THE STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP

Despite the fact that versions of the same open-ended balancing test
have permeated the key areas of United States transnational litigation
procedure, the academic community remained locked in a debate over the
acceptability of the balancing tests as originally formulated in antitrust
cases dealing with jurisdiction to prescribe. The debate continues to concern primarily which version of the balancing test should be applied.
These same commentators have failed to take the next step and address
how the balancing of interests test can be applied in a meaningful way
as throughout transnational litigation in the United States.81
Although interest balancing and the principle of comity have support
in the academic community, 2 the Timberlane balancing test is widely
criticized on the basis of both procedural and substantive grounds."' The
Timberlane test has the effect of extending rather than restricting jurisdiction over conduct outside the United States.8 4 For example, the first
prong of the test permits a court to exercise jurisdiction if there is some
effect in the United States, even in the absence of an actual and intended
85
effect, or a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect.
Timberlane then requires the parties and the court to determine,
through a costly and lengthy balancing process, whether jurisdiction
should be exercised.8 8 This process allows a discretionary comity analysis
instead of setting forth mandatory rules of jurisdiction.
Commentators condemn the entire concept of balancing of foreign interests by a branch of the United States government as an invasion of

Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp.

118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987); Sandsend Fin. Consultants Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d
364 (Tex. App. 1988); but see Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D.
33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
81.
need to
routine
82.

The importance of giving content to the balancing process is enhanced given the
apply the test in congested state and federal courts of general jurisdiction in more
contract and tort litigation of lesser stakes.
2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD

§ 18.28 (2d ed. 1981); Small, supra note 40; Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial
Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350 (1983);
Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 323 (1981).
83. 4 V. NANDA & D. PANSIus, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
U.S. COURTS § 5.02[4 (1990) (ideal theoretically, too complicated in application).

84.

IN

Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 608-09.

85. Id. at 610.
86. Id. at 612. For example, the resolution of Timberlane under the balancing test
required an additional eight years of litigation after the district court initially dismissed

the case under the effects test.
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foreign sovereignty. 87 These commentators contend that courts applying
the balancing of interests test have not been faithful to comity principles
by deemphasizing foreign interests and routinely asserting jurisdiction.88
Foreign commentators are also concerned that balancing foreign interests
against those of the United States and then finding the foreign interests
less compelling is likely to produce more friction than applying a principled version of the intended effects test.89 The Timberlane balancing approach also has been criticized as a judicial abdication of congressionally
conferred jurisdiction. Additionally, Timberlane has been criticized for
elevating private litigation into potential international disputes between
states91 and for injecting the judiciary into the political arena.92
Many commentators also indicate that a comity-based approach is

87.

D.

ROSENTHAL

& W.

KNIGHTON,

NATIONAL

LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL

86 (1982); Griffin, Potential
Resolutions of International Disputes Over Enforcement of United States Antitrust
Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279, 294-95 (1982) (United States court not the proper
forum to consider foreign governmental interests); Lowe, The Problems of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Economic Sovereignty and the Search for a Solution, 34 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 724 (1985); Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 268-69 (1981) [hereinafter Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction].
88. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 86; Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal,50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 16-22 (1987); Hoechner, A Swiss Perspective
on Conflicts ofJurisdiction, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 278-79 (1987); Lowe,
Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,supra note 87, at 268-69; Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An IntersectionBetween Public and PrivateInternational Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Note, Predictabilityand Comity: Toward
Common Principles of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,98 HARV. L. REV. 1310 (1985).
89. Hacking, The Increasing ExtraterritorialImpact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for
Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1979).
90. Sennett & Gavil, Antitrust Jurisdiction,ExtraterritorialConduct and InterestBalancing,19 INT'L LAW. 1185, 1208-10 (1985); Kadish, Comity and the International
Application of the Sherman Act: Encouragingthe Courts to Enter the PoliticalArena, 4
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1982); Rahl, InternationalApplication ofAmerican Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336 (1980).
91. Simon & Waller, A Theory of Economic Sovereignty: An Alternative to ExtraterritorialJurisdictionalDisputes, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1986); Waller & Simon,
supra note 1, at 1.
92. 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 35, § 5 & n. 167; Sennett &
Gavil, supra note 90, at 1210-11; Kadish, supra note 90; Note, Forum Non Conveniens
and the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J.
1693, 1702 (1985); but see Meessen, Antitrust JurisdictionUnder Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 806 (1984) (legitimacy of balancing public policy
factors under international law).
COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
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simply unworkable."3 Timberlane fails to provide a workable framework
within which interests can be balanced and provides little guidance assigning weight to the various factors of the test.9 4 Such a fact specific test
invites litigation on jurisdictional questions with the consequent wasting
of judicial resources on matters with tangential domestic impact better
95
handled by a priori rules of jurisdiction.
Critics of the comity approach generally propose returning to a principled version of the effects test9" or limiting the courts' discretion in considering jurisdictional questions through external principles such as non97
interference, predictability, sovereignty, due process, and true comity.
Other proposed solutions include reliance on consultation, harmonization
of competition norms, and the negotiation of explicit bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding jurisdiction.9" Furthermore, creating an in-

93.

Note, supra note 92, at 1701. For example, the court in Laker Airways Ltd. v.

Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), thoughtfully examined
the bases for deferring to British interests in a controversial private antitrust action
brought by the receiver of a defunct airline against the leading national airlines of Europe. The court ultimately found "no neutral principles on which to distinguish judicially the reasonableness of the concurrent, mutually inconsistent exercises of jurisdiction
in this case . . ." Id. at 953.
94. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 82, § 6.15; Gerber, Beyond Balancing: InternationalLaw Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE INT'L L.J.
185 (1984); Note, supra note 88, at 1310.
95. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
96. B. HAWK, 1 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 153-56 (1989); Wood, Conflicts ofJurisdiction in Antitrust Law: A Comment on Ordover and Atwood, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179

(1987); Fox, Extraterritoriality,Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is "Reasonableness" the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 591 (1987); Note, Beyond the
Rhetoric of Comparative Interest Balancing: An Alternative Approach to Extraterritorial Discovery Conflicts, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1987).
97. Brilmayer, supra note 88, at 37-38 (due process limitations); Gerber, supra note
94, at 185 (international law constraints); Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,
supra note 87, at 268-69; Note, supra note 88, at 1310; but see Note, Constructing the

State Extraterritorially:JurisdictionalDiscourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1273 (1990) (arguing that resolution of jurisdictional
conflicts requires redefinition of nation state and relationship to subject of regulation).
98. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 90-91; Wood, InternationalJurisdictionin National Legal Systems: The Case of Antitrust, 10 Nw. J. INr'L

L. & Bus. 56 (1989); M6schel, International Restraints of Competition: A Regulatory
Outline, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 76 (1989); Joelson, Harmonization:A Doctrinefor
the Next Decade, 10 Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. 133 (1989); Atwood, Conflicts ofJurisdiction
in the Antitrust Field: The Example of Export Cartels, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
153, 162 (1987); Tower & Willett, Enforceability and the Resolution of International

JurisdictionalConflicts: Comments on Abbott, Atwood, and Ordover, 50

LAW
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ternational forum for resolving international antitrust disputes99 and
substantively revising United States antitrust laws have been suggested
as possible solutions. 0 0
Critics generally agree only that Timberlane and its progeny provide
courts with an excess of unguided discretion on whether and how to balance foreign interests.'0 1 Continued variations on the existing themes
will neither prevent conflicts from arising, nor fully eliminate judicial
discretion and result-oriented jurisprudence.
V.

THE CHALLENGE THAT LIES AHEAD

The continuing criticism of Timberlane and the multiplicity of alternative approaches is unproductive and threatens to produce a theoretical
incoherence that retards consistent application of principles of comity in
antitrust and general transnational litigation. The cacophony of voices
provides litigants and courts with no guidance on using the balancing of
interests process. In addition to the external critiques of the balancing
process, analysis must consider the actual application of the general balancing of interests in litigation, and the manner in which parties can
limit the discretion of the court through the evidence they present.
Unlimited judicial discretion aids interested parties attempting to prevail on the basis of rhetoric, rather than well-founded claims relating to
conduct abroad. Litigants and governments have a shared interest in
avoiding the litigation of controversial government and private transnational actions based on either parochial domestic interests or unwarranted deference to specious claims of foreign interests.

TEMP. PROBS. 189, 192 (1987); Hoechner, supra note 88, at 279-81; Snyder, Interna-

tional Competition: Toward a Normative Theory of United States Antitrust Law and
Policy, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 257, 318-23 (1985) (proposing model bilateral agreement);
Small, supra note 40, at 290; Griffin, supra note 87, at 305; cf. Meessen, Competition of
Competition Law, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L & Bus. 17 (1990) (encouraging diversity of national approaches and warning against costs of attempts to overharmonize).
99.

D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 91; Meessen, supra note

92, at 809.
100. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 87-88; 2 J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, supra note 82, § 18.31; Griffin, supra note 87, at 302-04.

101.

But see Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back

Again," 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 15-16 (1984) (comity and reasonableness used as principles to guide exercise of discretion, not as substitutes for analysis).
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The Burden of Balancing

The balancing of governmental interests is not impossible.1 0 2 However, this type of general balancing of interests at the very earliest stages
of the litigation imposes a tremendous burden on all parties. The balancing of interests test may require additional discovery and expense. This
burden is inevitable whenever the parties are called upon to litigate issues that go beyond the private interests of the clients and encompass the
interests of the states whose nationals are involved in the dispute.
Similarly, the requirements of the interest-balancing tests impose an
equally heavy burden on the judicial system. The complicated issues of
comity and balancing national interests add to the already crowded trial
court dockets. In general, these courts lack significant experience in adjudicating cases involving international and comparative law. Even the
most sophisticated federal district court judge typically lacks a background in international law and confronts such issues only in limited
circumstances each year. Further, trial court judges and their law clerks
typically lack access to international or comparative law materials and
lack familiarity with international legal research methods.10 3
B.

The Uniqueness of Balancing

The Timberlane balancing of interests test and its progeny is significantly more complex than the balancing tests most familiar to United
States lawyers and judges. The United States legal system is most familiar with the limited balancing of interests used in forum non conveniens
and transfers of venue.'0° This type of analysis seldom extends
beyond the private interests of the parties and issues of convenience of
litigation.
Analogies to choice of law principles are also of limited value. The
distinction between the two types of analyses is complicated by the adop-

102.

See Meessen, Conflicts ofJurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 64 (1987); Meessen, supra note 92, at 806-07.

103. See Committee Report, JudicialEducation on InternationalLaw Committee of
the Section of InternationalLaw of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24
INT'L LAW. 903 (1990).
104. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947). See Note, supra note 92, at 1706-14 (distinguishing factors considered under forum non conveniens analysis and Timberlane balancing process). Moreover, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not applicable to antitrust litigation. United
States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits a federal district court to transfcr - '.i,- to another
federal court for the convenience of parties and witnesses.
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tion of identical vocabularies to describe very different processes.10 6 The
so-called "interest balancing" test in modern choice of law analysis is
10 7
different in both purpose and application from the test in Timberlane.
In subject matter and personal jurisdiction questions, a United States
court is seeking to determine whether it has the power to proceed in a
particular case and whether that power should be exercised.' 08 In choice
of law analysis, a court with proper jurisdiction seeks to determine
which substantive law should be applied in the case.'0 9
Moreover, the actual interest balancing test in most choice of law
questions has come to mean a very different process than the
Timberlane, Asahi, and Arospatiale tests. Modern interest analysis in
conflicts law evolved to replace the traditional lex loci test. Under this
traditional analysis, a court with proper jurisdiction applied the law of
where the wrong occurred in deciding multistate tort claims.1 10 Modern
choice of law theory replaced this test with an analysis of multiple factors to determine which state represented the center of gravity for the
tort claim in dispute. 1
106.
1986).
107.

See R.

WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

89-93 (3d ed.

Juenger, ConstitutionalControl of Extraterritoriality?:A Comment on ProfesLAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 40 (1987).
See Maier, supra note 101, at 24.
Id.

sor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50
108.
109.

110. R.

WEINTRAUB,

supra note 106, at 280-359.

111. Id. See also Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 972 (1952). Although the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts*of Law drew on
many sources, the center of gravity approach was one of the primary sources it incorporated. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. Comp. L. 1,
8 (1984).
Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law states:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
a) the place where the injury occurred,
b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 145 (1971).
Section 6 deals with the related issue of the choice of law principle to be applied to
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The search for the "center of gravity" is too often a weighing of the
private, but not the public factors of Timberlane."2 Such public law
factors almost never are reached in a domestic conflicts case comparing
the "interests" of two states within the United States federal system.' 13
As Professor Juenger has noted: "governmental interests in domestic
choice-of-ldw cases are tenuous, if not entirely lacking ....
The principal tasks of modern interest analysis are the identification
and resolution of false conflicts in which only one state has any interests
to be advanced, and the application of the law of the forum in true conflict cases."1 5 The high degree of shared interests and ,similarity of substantive law between the United States and other states regarding private
law matters, however, reduces the number of true international conflicts
that arise.'
Conflicts analysis rarely addresses articulated substantive state interests and focuses instead on the reach of statutes when the legislature has
been silent."' The "interests" that this analysis seeks to identify is the
interest of the jurisdiction in applying its policies, and not in the substantive policies themselves." 8 Accordingly, one of the founders of interest analysis expressly argued against any type of explicit balancing of
9
affirmative state interests in the case of a true conflict."
In practice, choice of law decisions operate differently than the true
balancing of interests adopted in Timberlane, Asahi, and Mrospatiale.
Choice of law systems typically have built-in default rules that eliminate
the need for the complex balancing of national interests and policies. 2

determine the applicable substantive law. Id. § 6.
112. Id.
113. Juenger, supra note 107, at 42.
114. Id.; Juenger, supra note 111, at 10-11, 37-39; cf R. WEINTRAUB, supra note
106, at 284 ("Seeking a rational solution to a true conflict does not involve 'weighing' the
interests of the two jurisdictions.").
115. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 106, at 281-84; Juenger, supra note 111, at 912.
116. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 86.
117. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MIcH. L.
REV. 392, 400-01 (1980).
118. Id. at 393, 417-23.
119.

B.

CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

182, 606, 610, 617

(1963).
120. Such analysis in true international conflicts cases is limited by the rule that a
case may be dismissed for failure to plead and prove foreign law, or in the alternative, a
court simply will apply forum law in the absence of proof of a contrary foreign law.
Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701 F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1983); Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
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In addition, courts continue to use multifactor tests relating to the number of contacts with a jurisdiction and a speculative, rather than evidentiary, analysis of the interests of other jurisdictions. 1 '
C.

Bringing Content to Balancing

Litigants engaged in a true balancing of national interests must provide the court with a sufficient evidentiary record to permit decisions on
a principled basis. While existing cases identify a laundry list of factors
for a court to consider,' 2 2 there is little guidance in applying these factors, the burden of proof, or the nature of evidence to be presented.' 2 3
Cases too often consist of the rhetoric of the parties and the ill-defined
exercise of discretion of the court. It is insufficient to indicate a common
law or statutory cause of action and the existing local discovery rules on
behalf of a plaintiff or the sovereign interests of a foreign state on behalf
of a defendant.' 24 The type of domestic or foreign interests that warrants
deference by a United States court, the manner in which the state has
chosen to express this interest, and the sources of record evidence available to document those interests remain unanswered.
1.

What Foreign Interests Matter?

To make the balancing of interests process meaningful, "foreign inter-'
ests" must be something other than a vague and generalized preference
that a state's nationals avoid liability when sued in foreign courts. The

(1982); 1700 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. GBR Associates, 354 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1965); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
Moreover, the desirability and actual meaning of interest balancing even in true conflicts of law remains in substantial controversy. It is not desirable to import this confusion into the equally difficult areas of personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction to prescribe.
For a survey of the shortcomings of interest analysis in choice of law questions, see
Juenger, supra note 111, at 1.
121. See Judge v. American Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (choosing domestic state law over Mexican law barring cause of action based on speculation as
to Mexican policy from comments to Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws).
122. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., 1 J. ATwOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 82, § 6.18 (analyzing
significance of foreign policy interests in balancing); THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note

24, § 403 reporters' note 6 (suggests consulting diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, parliamentary records, and more informal communications such as press conferences and
communiques).
124. Arguments regarding sovereignty are one of the most frequent areas of abuse in
the balancing of national interests. See Waller & Simon, supra note 1, at 1; Simon &
Waller, supra note 91, at 337.
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interests of the state itself must be implicated in the litigation. This suggests that the foreign defendant or state must articulate some fundamental, pre-existing national policy that is threatened by the issue before the
court.
A strong argument exists that these interests should be limited to those
rights of the state that are recognized by public international law or to
situations in which the state itself will suffer injury.'2 5 Under classic
international law, the state itself is unable to bring a legal claim on behalf of its national unless there is a violation of international law. 1'2 6
There is no persuasive reason to permit the converse and allow a private
party to invoke the protection of the sovereign without the state being, in
effect, a real party in interest to the dispute.
Two commentators, Douglas Rosenthal and William Knighton, assert
that a state has an implied interest in exclusively regulating its enterprises and shielding them from any form of extraterritoriality.' 2 7 This
view is another version of the failed claim that extraterritoriality is not
consistent with international law or state practice.' 8 A general prefer125.
337.

See Waller & Simon, supra note 1, at 1; Simon & Waller, supra note 91, at

126. See, e.g., W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 742-43 (3d ed.
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 471-72 (1943).
127. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 29.

1971); 5 G. HACK-

128. The only judicial decision of an international tribunal directly on point condones the extraterritorial application of national law. In the S.S. Lotus decision, S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, the Permanent Court of International
Justice considered the jurisdiction of Turkey to bring criminal charges against a French
officer on a ship involved in a fatal collision on the high seas. The acts of the French
officer resulting in the collision were regarded as occurring on French "territory" by
virtue of the registration of the vessel under French law. Id. at 25. The collision resulted
in the deaths of eight crew and passengers aboard a Turkish vessel.
The Court held that international law did not prohibit the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, stating:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts
which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive
rule of international law .... Far from laying down a general prohibition to the
effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction
of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them
in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases
by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
Id. at 19; cf. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1941)
(each state owes duty to protect other states against injurious acts by individuals within
its jurisdiction).
In addition, the use of extraterritoriality has reached the degree of universality re-
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ence for laissez-faire is not the same as a specific and articulable national policy crucial to the integrity of the state and the promotion of its
national interests.' 9 Such a broad reading of national policy is an endorsement of protectionism and neo-mercantilism that is not legitimate
under the language and spirit of the international trading system.' 30
Rosenthal and Knighton further suggest that a foreign state should be
permitted to retroactively validate private conduct by assuming responsibility for conduct that the state either may not have known or approved
in advance. They contend, without support, that: "[i]t is the nature of
national sovereignty to include the right of retroactive official endorsement of conduct which initially was private and unofficial."'' This position is not supported by either international or domestic United States
law, and it represents a fundamental misconception of the meaning of
sovereignty. Such a policy would have the unfortunate effect of increasing controversy rather than promoting dispute resolution and unnecessarily injecting diplomatic conflict into private litigation.' 3 2
2.

The Expression of National Interests

The fundamental interests of states normally are expressed through
such traditional hierarchical sources in a well-developed legal system as
a constitution, statutes, regulations, and the multiplicity of statements by
governmental decision makers in the exercise of their duties.' 33 Decisionmakers must be sensitive and avoid applying a parochial view of foreign governmental processes. Some legal systems, such as Great Britain's, do not have a written constitution, and derive constitutional
principles from custom and practice.134 Similarly, domestic legislation

quired for the assertion that extraterritoriality is permitted as a rule of customary international law. Fox, supra note 96, at 601; Meessen, supra note 102, at 58-65; Meessen,
supra note 92, at 798-805 (effects test with consideration of foreign interests supported

by state practice); Davidow, ExtraterritorialAntitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 500 (1981); but see Griffin, supra note 87, at 282. See also infra
notes 155-78 and accompanying text describing state use and acceptance of
extraterritoriality.
129. Simon & Waller, supra note 91, at 349; Waller & Simon, supra note 1, at 8-9.
130. Simon & Waller, supra note 91, at 349; Waller & Simon, supra note 1, at 8-9.
Accord THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 442, comment c.
131. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 30.

132. Waller & Simon, supra note 1, at 4-6.
133. This tends to exclude those nations whose national interests represent nothing
more than the personal whim of an authoritarian ruler or rulers.
134. See D. YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed.

1984).
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will differ from state-to-state depending on the constitutional relationship between the legislative and executive branches, and national traditions regarding the granting of discretion in enforcing statutes.
These factors suggest the necessity of analyzing the actual practice of
the state involved to ascertain the national interests to be balanced. This
approach is consistent with the principles governing international law
and the focus on the custom and practice of states as a source for law.135
An emphasis on actual practice resolves the difficult problems of interpreting legislative intent of a foreign government whose conduct and true
purpose may be quite different from the stated purpose of statutes and
regulations.' 36 In addition, actual practice is capable of accounting for
fundamental interests not embodied in sources akin to United States governmental tradition.
3.

Documenting Foreign Interests

It is possible to present direct evidence in litigation as to the respective
interests of the United States and a foreign government. This presentation, however, depends on the willingness of the effected governments to
communicate their views to the court supervising the litigation. The
United States government rarely sets forth its views, except when obligated to do so under a treaty."3 7 It is equally difficult for a foreign defendant to persuade a foreign government to intervene or submit amicus
briefs in support of its interests.' 3 8

135. I.C.J. Statute, Art. 38.
136. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
137. See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNiGHTON, supra note 87, at 87; Griffin, supra
note 87, at 291-94, 299-300 (advocating increased use of United States government amicus briefs and Suggestions of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 in private international antitrust litigation); Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 254-56, 263 (1982) (advocating more active
United States governmental amicus participation).
One of few times the United States offered its views in a private foreign commerce
antitrust case occurred in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U,S. 574 (1986). The Justice Department previously had refused the invitation of both
sides to participate in the lower courts. The Supreme Court requested the views of the
Justice Department as to the granting of certiorari and the decision on the merits. The
Department of Justice argued that the plaintiffs had failed to prove an actionable conspiracy under the antitrust laws and the conduct of the Japanese defendants was immune
pursuant to the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. The Court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on substantiye antitrust grounds, and did not
discuss the other points raised by the Justice Department and the parties.
138. See Note, Foreign Government Participationin United States Antitrust Litigation, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 605 (1981); but see 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra
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The active participation of either the United States or a foreign government in the private litigation often raises complications. Both governments argue that their views as to the disposition of the litigation should
be given conclusive effect by the court. Countering these arguments requires an understanding of the nuances of the act of state doctrine as
interpreted by United States courts. The classic formulation of this doctrine is that a United States court will not sit in judgment on the legality
of acts of foreign states under foreign law. 39 A United States court,
therefore, will abstain from adjudicating the merits of a case in which
such analysis is required.'""
The view that any position of the United States government is conclusive in litigation affecting foreign policy derives from an alternate basis
of the act of state doctrine. The Supreme Court previously emphasized
that the primary role of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign
affairs justified judicial abstention from cases involving conflicts with foreign policy. A corollary to that view of the act of state doctrine, the
Bernstein doctrine, required the United States government to certify affirmatively that litigation would not disrupt the conduct of foreign affairs
before the court adjudicates the matter.-"4 The separation of powers rationale underlying the act of state and Bernstein doctrines, however, is
used less often. Even in cases involving affirmative statements of potential damage to foreign affairs, courts have not abstained from adjudicating the matter.' 42
On the other hand, foreign governments claim that the act of state
doctrine requires United States courts to give conclusive effect to its interpretation of its own law.' 43 While a court may be bound by the
description of certain facts and their significance under foreign law, a
court still has the ability and the obligation to determine the significance

note 82, § 6.18; Shenefield, Extraterritorialityin Antitrust, 15

LAW

&

POL'Y INT'L

Bus. 1109, 1116 (1983) (potential reluctance of foreign governments to reveal interests in
United States litigation).
139. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S. Ct. 701
(1990); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).

140. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 110 S. Ct. at 707; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
141. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d. 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Bernstein has been replaced by a practice of the courts

proceeding unless the government contends that foreign policy objectives would be injured. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984).
142.

First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).

143. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 220 (1942).
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of those statements under United States law in deciding the issue before
the court. 4 4
Whether direct governmental participation occurs, counsel for private
litigants have to articulate national interests through the use of international and comparative law research. 4" The governing law of each state
with a potential interest in a dispute is set out in the state's consistent
conduct, its domestic legislation and regulations, the text and negotiating
history of its treaties and executive agreements, and its participation in
international organizations. 4 6
In the United States federal system, proof of foreign law is governed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A party may present evidence
regardless of its admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, provided it indicates the existence and meaning of foreign law. 4 7 A party
intending to raise an issue concerning foreign law must give reasonable
notice.' 4 8 A party may prove the requirements of foreign law by submis-

144. For example, consider a case involving a claim that conduct in Japan was exempt from the application of United States antitrust laws because the private parties had
been compelled to undertake the conduct by the Japanese government. The Japanese
government submitted an amicus brief before the United States Supreme Court describing the actions it had taken, and its conclusion that it had "directed" the private conduct
at issue in the litigation. Assuming that a United States court was required to accept
these statements as true, the statements by themselves would not answer the paramount
question of legal interpretation whether such conduct qualified as a matter of United
States law under the foreign compulsion defense to the antitrust laws. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
145. For an excellent source on international legal research, see Williams, Guide to
International Law Research, 20 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1-413 (1986); see
also S. KLECKNER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1988).
146. Research on treaties can be particularly frustrating. Bilateral treaties in which
the United States is a party are published in the United States Treaties (U.S.T.) and the
Treaties and Other International Agreements Series (T.I.A.S.). Multilateral treaties in
which the United States is a party are published in the United Nations Treaty Series
(U.N.T.S.) and its predecessor, the League of Nations Treaty Series (L.N.T.S.), as well
as the U.S.T. and T.I.A.S. Treaties where the United States is not a signatory can be
found in the U.N.T.S., L.N.T.S., and the official foreign national treaty series. The
indexing of treaties in any of these series is often limited.
Significant United States treaties and executive agreements are normally reprinted in
International Legal Materials, a publication of the American Society of International
Law. An additional source of diplomatic materials and United States governmental views
is the Digest of International Law, which reprints key documents, but is not typically
timely in terms of publication.
Domestic and comparative legal sources including legislative history, administrative
regulations, and diplomatic correspondence also may be of help.
147, FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
148. Id.
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sion of foreign legal materials, affidavits, or testimony."" The court, in
determining the applicable foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source,' 5 ' and is subject to de novo review on appeal.' 5 '

VI.

AN ANTITRUST EXAMPLE

It is difficult to fully explain or illustrate the nature, expression, and
documentation of United States and foreign interests, and the application
of a truly evidence-based balancing of interests process in the abstract.
By way of example, consider the resolution of a question of jurisdiction
to prescribe in an antitrust action involving a foreign export cartel whose
products are sold in the United States from the perspective of a litigant
seeking to find record evidence in response to a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction in a court requiring a balancing of national interests.
A.

Comparative Law Sources

To assess the significance of the foreign interests involved in an antitrust action, the competition laws of the foreign state involved must be
examined. This analysis requires examination of three elements. First,
the private agreement or practice must be examined under the domestic
competition law of the foreign state.' 5 2 The legality of a practice within
a foreign market is significant in confirming that an anticompetitive
practice in international trade reflects foreign national policy.
Second, it is crucial to examine how the domestic competition law of
the foreign state regulates anticompetitive export conduct. For substantive, mercantilistic, and jurisdictional considerations, the treatment of anticompetitive conduct may vary significantly in domestic and export
contexts.' 53
Further, the existence of an export cartel does not conclusively indicate the existence of a favorable national policy, because the state's opin-

149.

Id.

150.

Note the significant dangers of judicial notice if the court's determination of

foreign law is not strictly guided by the parties.

151.
152.

Twohy v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985).
For excellent sources for determining foreign competition law, see J. VON
KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION (1987); ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC
COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS

PRACTICES (4th ed. 1976).
153. See OECD COMMITTEE

OF EXPERTS ON

RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS,

EXPORT

CARTELS (1974); Waller, The Ambivalence of United States Antitrust Policy Towards
Single-Country Export Cartels, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 98, 98 (1989).
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ion of the export cartel may vary.' 54 At one extreme, some states require
exporters to participate in price or quantity restrictions. Other states
merely permit the existence of such cartels and disregard their operation.
Other states do not condone the existence of export cartels, but find their
domestic laws inapplicable to pure export restrictions. Further, a given
export cartel may be illegal, or may exceed the bounds of its lawful existence subject to civil or criminal consequences.
Third, it is necessary to examine the foreign ttate's own attitudes towards extraterritoriality. This examination requires analysis of more
than just public pronouncements on the matter in controversy. Actual
state practice must be examined to determine if the state consistently
exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in areas of economic regulation.
The state's sponsorship or assent to international agreements that explicitly or implicitly endorse extraterritoriality is also relevant.
The European Economic Community (EC or Community) has applied its competition law in a manner similar to the traditional United
States effects doctrine on several occasions to conduct arising outside the
Community. In Imperial Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Commission,'5 5
for example, the European Court of Justice held that members of a cartel of dyestuffs producers located outside the EC violated article 85 of the
EEC Treaty, because their conduct produced anticompetitive effects
within the Community. 5 ' The court rejected the arguments of the defendants and the British government' 5 that international law forbids
such jurisdiction. 58 The strength of Imperial Chemical's endorsement of
the effects test is suspect, however, given the court's reliance on the presence .of wholly owned subsidiaries of the foreign defendants within the
Community to exercise jurisdiction. 59
The strongest endorsement to date of a pure effects test came in A.
Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (Wood Pulp).'" In Wood Pulp, the

154. Waller, supra note 153, at 111-13.
155. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 18161 (1971-73 Transfer Binder).
156. Id.,
157. See British Aide-Memoire, reprinted in I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 310 (3d ed. 1979). At the time of the incidents forming the basis
of the Dyestuffs case, Great Britain was not yet a member of the EEC.
158. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, Comm. Mkt. Rep. 18161, at p. 8005-07,
8030-31; cf. Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import S.A., 1971 E.C.R. 949, CCH 18149
(dicta endorsing effects doctrine).
159. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161.
160. [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 114,491 (Sept. 27, 1988)
[hereinafter Wood Pulp].
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European Court of Justice held that an international cartel of wood pulp
producers also violated article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. Wood Pulp is
significant because the defendants included foreign producers with no facilities or subsidiaries in the Community. 6' Without utilizing the effects
doctrine by name, the Court held that the cartel's conduct fell within the
62
Community's jurisdiction.1
Other states enforce their laws on an extraterritorial basis when conduct abroad adversely affects competition in their domestic market. In
Germany, the effects doctrine is part of the statutory competition provisions.' 6 The German competition authority has applied this provision to
both cartel and merger activity outside Germany.' In addition to Germany, the competition laws of several other states appear on their face to
be capable of extraterritorial application.'6

161. Id. at 18,603-04.
162. Id. at 18,611; see also Aluminum Imports from Eastern Europe, O.J. L 92
(Mar. 30, 1985), (1982-84 Transfer Binder) Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,658 (rejecting the argument that international law barred the exercise of jurisdiction over the
acts of foreign defendants outside of the Community).
163. Gesetz gegen Wettbewebsbeschrangungen BGBI.I 1761 § 98(2) (Sept. 24,
1980), translationreprinted in 5 WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION (Federal Republic of
Germany) part 9, app. 1 (1988); see also Stockmann, The Janus-Faceof Competition
Policies, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 31 (1989); Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983); cf Hblzler &
Braun, Antitrust Controls Over "Pure" Export Cartels: The New German Approach,

27

ANTITRUST BULL.

957 (1982).

164.

See Domestic Effects Within the Meaning of Section 98(2) of the Act Against
Restraints of Competition in the Case of Mergers, reprinted in ENFORCING ANTITRUST
AGAINST FOREIGN ENTERPRISES

104-05 (C. Canenbley ed. 1981) (unofficial translation

of unofficial guidelines).
165. See Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law ofJapan, in 11 LAW IN JAPAN 57, 68
(1978) (discussing extraterritorial application of antimonopoly law to international mar-

ket division between Japanese and West German firms); ENFORCING ANTITRUST
AGAINST FOREIGN ENTERPRISES, supra note 164, at 9-11 (speculating on the potential
extraterritorial application of the French, Swiss, and Australian competition laws).
Several of the states that choose not to exercise jurisdiction on an extraterritorial basis
have accepted, or mooted their opposition to, the United States exercise of such jurisdiction in competition matters. Such acceptance is the most widespread in government antitrust investigations, when the foreign government will have an opportunity to air its
grievances through diplomatic channels, and the United States government has committed itself to consider such views and interests of comity in exercising its prosecutorial
discretion.
Many of the developed nations have pledged to assist the United States through diplomatic contacts and consultations through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and through bilateral consultations on competition matters. Consultations on competition matters also are required by several treaties of Friendship,
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Even Great Britain, the strong dissenter in the extraterritoriality debate, applies its domestic law on an extraterritorial basis.166 For example, Great Britain interprets its Secrets Act as barring publication of
prohibited material anywhere in the world and has sought to prevent the
foreign publication of certain books.' 61 Similarly, Great Britain permits
gambling only at private clubs, and forbids the advertising of such clubs,
even in publications outside of Great Britain.' 6 8

Navigation and Commerce and Bilateral Investment Treaties between the United States
and other nations.
The United States has explicit bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements with several
nations. These agreements typically call for cooperation on competition matters, unless
such cooperation would be inconsistent with domestic law or important national interests.
Canada and the United States have had both formal and informal agreements regarding
antitrust matters dating back to 1959. The United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany entered into a similar agreement in 1976.
The most significant agreements of this type are the agreements in the 1980s with
Canada and Australia, both previously strident foes of extraterritoriality that have enacted blocking statutes specifically to defeat United States antitrust enforcement. While
neither of these agreements constitutes a blanket waiver of potential objections to United
States antitrust investigations or litigation, both states have agreed not to automatically
assert an invasion of self-defined sovereignty because of the mere existence of a United
States government investigation into conduct occurring within their borders.
For example, Article 5(2) of the Australia-United States Agreements states:
The mere seeking by legal process of information or documents located in
its territory shall not by itself be regarded by either Party as affecting adversely its significant national interests, or as constituting a basis for applying measures to prohibit the transmission of such information or documents
to the authorities of the Other Party, provided that in the case of United
States legal process prior notice has been given of its issuance.
In return, the United States has agreed to give prior notice of requests for information in
the state, consult regarding potential conflicts, and participate in private antitrust litigation involving such potential conflicts, and inform the court of the substance and outcome
of the consultations.
166. See Shenefield, The Perspective of the U.S. Department ofJustice, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER

LAWS 12, 18 (J. Griffin ed. 1979) (describing extraterritorial application of British statutes and criminal law); Willoughby, Remarks by an English Solicitor, in id. at 56.
Great Britain also has cited Timberlane with approval on at least one occasion in its
amicus brief in the Abrospatiale litigation. See Lowe & Worbrick, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and Extradition, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398, 402 (1987).

167.

See G.

PINCHER, THE SPYCATCHER AFFAIR

(1988); M.

TURNBULL, THE SPY-

(1988) (discussion of attempts to enjoin publication in Australia of book
regarding British counterintelligence); Spy Book Excerpts Get Magazine Banned, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 25, 1988 (threat of contempt proceedings against publisher outside of
Great Britain if it published classified excerpts in United States).
168. Gaming Act 1968, s.42.
CATCHER TRIAL
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In the regulation of business torts and crimes, Great Britain has asserted jurisdiction, for example, over attempted fraud on a life insurance
company consisting of a staged suicide in the United States.'" 9 Although
all conduct arose outside of Great Britain, the British courts asserted
jurisdiction since the effect of the fraud was in Great Britain where the
insurance company issued the policy.'
The most flagrant example of British extraterritoriality is the adoption
and use of the 1980 Protection of Trading Interests Act' 7 ' as a defensive
measure to counteract perceived excesses in United States jurisdictional
claims. The Act grants the British Government the power to prohibit
and block a private party's compliance with a foreign discovery request
seeking information located within Great BritainY.2 The Act also prohibits the enforcement of awards of multiple damages in Great Britain
arising out of competition matters.'17 The Act further permits a British
defendant in a foreign competition case to bring an action to recover any
portion of an award in excess of actual damages.'1 4 Although phrased to
apply to any foreign proceeding, the Act was intended primarily to address Britain's objections to United States antitrust proceedings against

169. Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, [1977] 2 ALL E.R. 909 (H.L.).
170. Id. at 915-17 (opinion of Lord Diplock), 920 (opinion of Viscount Dilhorne),
923 (opinion of Lord Salmon), 928 (opinion of Lord Edmund-Davies), 936-41 (opinion
of Lord Keith of Kinkel); cf. Secretary of State for Trade v. Marcus, [1976] A.C. 35
(jurisdiction for fraudulent inducements for investment abroad resulting in victim's investment in the United Kingdom); Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Doot, [1973] A.C.
807, [1973] All E.R. 940 (prosecution of drug conspiracy initiated outside of British
territory).
Even in the area of competition law, Great Britain has attempted to investigate and
regulate certain conduct by non-British firms outside of Great Britain. In Britain's attempts to prevent foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers from charging supercompetitive
prices for sales to public entities, Britain routinely requested elaborate price and cost
information from the foreign parents of British subsidiaries. See Rhinelander, The Roche
Case: One Giant Step for British Antitrust, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974). The failure of
a foreign firm to submit complete information was an explicit basis of the decision to
require drastic price reductions on the basis of the best information available. Monopolies Commission, Report on the Supply of Chlordiazepoxide and Diazepam (Apr. 11,
1973). A spirited debate ensued in the House of Commons as to the consistency between
Britain's own information requests and a contemporaneous order to a British pharmaceutical firm forbidding the provision of information in a United States antitrust investigation involving the pricing of a different drug. See House of Common Debates, 7-20
(June 18, 1973).
171. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch.11.
172. Id. §§ 2, 4.

173. Id. § 5.
174. Id. § 6.
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British subjects.' 75
The Act is phrased to protect Great Britain's trading interests around
the globe and not merely to protect an abstract principle of territorial
jurisdiction. The decision to invoke the Act's blocking provision is discretionary and assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of Britain's perceived self-interest.'17 This aspect alone suggests that the Act aims to
promote Britain's economic interests, both territorial and extraterritorial.17 Most commentators in the United States and Great Britain concede the extraterritorial effect of the Act, insofar as it relates to the conduct of British subjects outside of Great Britain and the ability to
78
interfere with the awards of a United States court.'
B.

InternationalLaw Sources

Two key international bodies, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), have addressed international
competition matters. The OECD includes the majority of states with ac-

175. See Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, supra note 87, at 257.
176. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 2.
177. The ironies of the Act were not lost on the House of Commons, which showed
concern for allegations that the Act partook of the same vice that it sought to cure. House
of Commons Debates 1548-49, 1555-60 (Nov. 15, 1979); House of Commons Debates
19-20 (Dec. 4, 1979); House of Commons Debates 61-62, 67-68 (Dec. 6, 1979).
178. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 87, at 78; Small, supra note 40,
at 284; Snyder, supra note 98, at 316 & n.248; but see Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction,supra note 87, at 274-75, 280. Professor Lowe concedes that the use of the
"clawback" provision could itself constitute a violation of "American sovereignty." Id. at
280. He argues that the blocking aspects of the Act are not extraterritorial: "Extraterritorial effects on British trade are no more than the occasion for the exercise of intraterritorial (or national) jurisdiction: no jurisdiction is claimed over the extraterritorial
causes." Id. at 275. Professor Lowe's argument, however, is undercut by the Act's application to the conduct of British subjects outside of Great Britain.
Ultimately, Great Britain's position on extraterritoriality is largely preempted by its
membership in the EC, and the EC's own use of extraterritoriality. See supra notes 15562 and accompanying text. Regardless of whether British domestic law would allow such
jurisdiction, a British subject could bring an action in British courts to enforce rights
under articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty alleging the type of effects jurisdiction that the
European Court of Justice has previously endorsed. Id. See D. GOYDER,EEC COMPETITION LAW 352-57 (1988). A private plaintiff could even use articles 85 and 86 as a
basis to recover actual damages in national courts for a violation of EC competition principles. Garden Cottage Foods, Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 770 (denying
injunctive relief because of availability of damages for violation of EC competition
provisions).

1991]

INTEREST BALANCING IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION

tive competition enforcement authorities.179 The OECD arranges regular
meetings and consultations among the competition authorities of its
member states. The OECD also has promulgated a series of resolutions
regarding cooperation among its members in competition matters. s °
The OECD is also a prodigious source of reports and other scholarly
materials on competition. The OECD published the competition laws of
its members,' 8 ' studies on the regulation of export cartel practices by its
members,' 8 2 and other comparative works on competition law and economic regulation. 83 Substantively, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises set standards to prevent enterprises from adversely affecting competition. 8 4

179. The members of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United
States. Japan is the principal industrialized nation with a system of national competition
law that is not a member.
180. See 1986 OECD Recommendation Concerning Cooperation Between Member
States on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, reprinted in 25
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

1629 (1986); see also OECD Recommendations Concerning

Cooperation Between Member States on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, Oct. 5, 1967, July 3, 1973, and Sept. 25, 1979, reprintedin EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 243-45, 251-54 (A. Lowe ed. 1981).
181. GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (4th ed.
1976); see also COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES

182.

OECD

PORT CARTELS

183.

SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIONS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS

(1978).
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, Ex-

(1974).

See PREDATORY PRICING (1989); COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

(1989);

DEREGULATION

AND AIRLINE COMPETITION

TIONAL MERGERS AND COMPETITION POLICY

(1988);

(1988);

COMPETITION

INTERNA-

POLICY AND

JOINT VENTURES (1987); COMPETITION POLICY IN OECD COUNTRIES (annual
volumes); COMPETITION POLICY AND THE PROFESSIONS (1985); MERGER POLICIES
AND RECENT TRENDS IN MERGERS (1984); COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICES:
THEIR INTERACTION (1984); COMPETITION LAw ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL

(1984).
184. The Guidelines discourage:
1) the abuse of a dominant position including anticompetitive acquisitions, predatory behavior, unreasonable refusals to deal, abuse of intellectual property rights,
and price discrimination; or
2) participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening the restrictive effects of
international or domestic cartels.
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, reprinted in EXTRATERRITOCOOPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

RIAL JURISDICTION,

supra note 180, at 246-47. OECD members are urged to adopt

legislation barring these same practices in the OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Action Against Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade Including Those Involving Multinational Enterprise, adopted July 20, 1978, reprinted in
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UNCTAD also has dealt extensively with competition policy.
UNCTAD's membership and interests are significantly more diverse
than the OECD, and include lesser developed states, and both market
and planned economies. Hence, UNCTAD's agenda and work product
tend to compromise true competition law and national economic development principles. Despite these differences, UNCTAD has produced a
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices,1 85 adopted by unanimous
United Nations declaration.""6 The UNCTAD principles state that enterprises should refrain from practices which "limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have
adverse effects on international trade .... 87
Because foreign antitrust issues are related inextricably to international trade practices, litigants may also find the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)18 8 useful in structuring arguments regarding
the balancing of national interests. Although few provisions of GATT
deal directly with competition issues,"' 9 the language of GATT itself, the
recommendations of GATT dispute resolution panels,' 90 the interpreta-

supra note 180, at 248-50.
185. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), reprinted in
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 180, at 257.
186. General Assembly Resolution 35/63, Dec. 5, 1980, reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 180, at 256-57.
187. Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles, supra note 185, at D(3)(emphasis
added). The UNCTAD principles further set forth specific practices to be avoided,
including:
1) import and export cartels;
2) bid rigging;
3) quantity, market and customer allocations among competitors;
4) concerted refusals to deal; and
5) the abuse of a dominant position including predation, anticompetitive mergers,
price discrimination, resale price maintenance in export markets, abuse of intellectual property rights, tying, and certain vertical restraints on distribution.
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION,

Id. at D(3)(a-f.
188. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
55 U.N.T.S. 188, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter GATT].
189. See Art. 17, GATT, supra note 188 (regulating state trading); cf. arts. 6, 16
GATT (regulating dumping and government subsidies).

190. Art. 23, GATT, supra note 188; see generally Bello & Homer, Settling Disputes in the GATT: The Past, Present and Future, 24 INT'L LAW. 519 (1990); Van
Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure,22(4) J. WORLD TRADE L. 67 (1988);
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987).

19911

INTEREST BALANCING IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION

tive agreements executed by GATT signatories, 1 9' and the reports and
views expressed in the various GATT negotiating rounds represent a
consensus of trading nations as to the permissible trade practices. 92
Similarly, the work of international governmental organizations and
international nongovernmental organizations are relevant in a United
States antitrust challenge to conduct in a specific industry regulated by
the work of these organizations. The United Nations is the most prominent, but by no means the only, international organization where the
United States and foreign nations exchange views on matters that address competition policy. The negotiating history and the actual agreements creating these organizations also may contain valuable references
to the strength of the United States and foreign interests involved. The
work product of the organizations is further evidence of customary international law relevant to the balancing process.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The concept of extraterritoriality is here to stay. In United States antitrust enforcement, comity and the balancing of interests prevail. Despite
significant and well-founded criticism, this balancing of interests has expanded beyond its original boundaries to pervade United States transnational litigation practice. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has failed to give meaning or guidance to the balancing tests it continues
to endorse, and subsequent lower court decisions fail to provide much
more.
The academic community has been negligent in failing to fill this void.
The focus of scholarship and litigation must shift from old debates to
focus on the consistent and principled balancing of United States and

191. See 26th Supp., Basic Instruments and Selected Documents of GATT: Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement (Subsidies and countervailing Duties Code); Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement (Revised GATT Antidumping Code);
Agreement on Government Procurement, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of
the General Agreement (Customs Valuation); Protocol to the Agreement on Customs
Valuation; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code); Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures; International Dairy Agreement; Agreement on Bovine
Meat; Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.
192. See also the Havana Charter, the failed predecessor to GATT, which contemplated a more formal international trade organization and included explicit competition
provisions. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, art. 46, U.N. Doc.
E/Conf. 2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948), reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Pub. No. 3206,
Commercial Policy Series 114 (1948); see generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT 35-49 (1969).
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foreign interests. To make this system work, both the bench and the bar
must be the subject of an intensive educational process. The demystification of these issues and the incorporation into mainstream commercial
litigation practice will assure parties adequate representation and informed and consistent judicial rulings.

